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the issue concerned whether the defendant's rights were violated
by the overzealous standby counsel. 1850 The Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals judgment, which completely limited

the role of standby counsel when defendant had objected, and
instead held counsel may not substantially interfere with any
significant tactical decisions, or control the questioning of
witnesses or speak instead of the defendant on any matter of
importance. 1851
Therefore, under the New York State Constitution and the
Federal Constitution, a pro se defendant, who is actively
asserting his right to self-representation, cannot be arbitrarily and
sidebar
participating
in
barred
from
categorically
85
conferences. 1 7

18 5 3
People v. Ruff
(decided June 8, 1993)

Petitioner, convicted of murder in the first degree, claimed that
his right to counsel under both the New

York1 8 5 4

and

1850. Id. at 176.
1851. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 184. The Court made explicit what was already
implied in Faretta:
A defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not violated when a trial
judge appoints standby counsel - even over the defendant's objection to relieve the judge of the need to explain and enforce basic rules of
courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant in overcoming routine
obstacles that stand in the way of the defendant's achievement of his
own clearly indicated goals. Participation by counsel to steer a
defendant through basic procedures of trial is permissible even in the
unlikely event that it somewhat undermines the pro se defendant's
appearance of control over his own defense.
Id.
1852. Rosen, 81 N.Y.2d at 245, 613 N.E.2d 946, 597 N.Y.S.2d 914; see
also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818-19 (finding that Sixth Amendment guarantees a
criminal defendant the corollary right to dispense with counsel and to present
his defense in the manner of his choosing).
1853. 81 N.Y.2d 330, 615 N.E.2d 611, 599 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1993).
1854. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "In any trial in any
court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in
person and with counsel ...

.

." Id.
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Federal 1855 Constitutions was violated. 1856 In the absence of
representation by counsel on the pending sexual abuse charges,
the defendant gave statements to the police about murdering his
cousin, which were not suppressed at trial. 1857 The court of
appeals affirmed the appellate court's decision and held that the
defendant's statements were not required to be suppressed
because the police's questioning of defendant on the unrelated
matter of the murder during the sex crime investigation, did not
interfere with an attorney-client relationship. 1858
In 1987 an arrest warrant was issued, charging the defendant
with sexual abuse in the first degree. 1859 When defendant's
cousin, a police dispatcher, learned about the warrant, he
informed investigators that he believed the defendant had
murdered his brother. 1860 When state police officials located the
defendant, they read him his Miranda rights, and questioned him
about his participation in a number of sex crimes. 186 1 The
defendant admitted to those crimes and signed a written

confession. 1862
Initially, the defendant denied having any knowledge regarding
the murder of his cousin. 1863 However, the following day, when
the defendant took a polygraph test, he admitted that he killed his
cousin, and was thereafter arrested. 1864 At the pre-trial hearing,
the defendant made a motion to suppress the murder confession.
He claimed that allowing the statements into evidence violated his

1855. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall ...have the assistance of counsel for his
defense." Id.
1856. Ruff, 81 N.Y.2d at 333, 615 N.E.2d at 613, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
1857. Id. at 332-33, 615 N.E.2d at 613, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
1858. Id. at 334-35, 615 N.E.2d at 614, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
1859. Id. at 332, 615 N.E.2d at 612, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
1860. Id.
1861. Id.
1862. Id.
1863. Id.
1864. Id. at 332-33, 615 N.E.2d at 612-13, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 222-23.
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"right to counsel which had attached with regard to the pending
1 86 5
sexual abuse charges."
The court found that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
were not violated by the lower courts' refusal to suppress the
defendant's statements on matters unrelated to the original
charges of sexual abuse. 1866 The court reasoned that the state
police officials were not precluded from questioning the
defendant on the unrelated murder because an attorney-client
relationship had not been established with respect to the pending
charges and therefore, the questioning had not interfered with
867
such a relationship. 1
The court's reasoning was based primarily on its narrow
interpretation, in People v. Kazmarick,18 68 of the holding in
People v. Rogers. 1869 In Kazmarick, an alcoholic defendant was
suspected of an act of arson which resulted in the death of five
people.1870 When the defendant took a polygraph test, he was in
a state of intoxication and his test was voided. 187 1 Two days
later, the defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct,
assaulting a police officer, and criminal mischief. 1872 Subsequent
to his release, the defendant took another polygraph test in which
he admitted to unintentionally setting the fire. 1873 On the trial
level, the defendant made a motion to suppress his confession and
claimed that the pendency of a shoplifting charge with an
issuance of a warrant for his arrest "caused his right to counsel to
attach 'indelibly' on the unrelated arson case. " 1874 The court
found that the pending criminal charges did not preclude the

1865. Id. at 333, 615 N.E.2d at 613, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 223; see also People
v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1980).
1866. Ruff, 81 N.Y.2d at 335, 615 N.E.2d at 614, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 224.

1867.
1868.
1869.
1870.
249.
1871.
1872.
1873.
1874.

Id. at 334-35, 615 N.E.2d at 614, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
52 N.Y.2d 322, 420 N.E.2d 45, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1981).
48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979).
Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d at 325, 420 N.E.2d at 47, 438 N.Y.S.2d at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 326, 420 N.E.2d 47, 438 N.Y.S.2d 249.
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police from questioning the defendant on an unrelated matter
when the defendant was not represented by counsel. 1875
The court in Rogers held that once a lawyer has entered the
proceeding on prior pending charges, the police are prohibited
from questioning the defendant on both related and unrelated
matters. 1876 However, in Kazmarick, the court distinguished its
prior decision in Rogers, and held that pending criminal charges
do not bar the police from questioning the accused on an
unrelated matter. 1877 Although the Kazmarick court affirmed the
Rogers court's decision along with its line of cases, the court
noted that these cases were only applicable to situations where a
lawyer was present or had entered the pending proceedings. 1878
In the case at bar, the defendant was informed of his right to
counsel but he waived his right since he never requested nor
retained a lawyer.1 879 Consequently, no attorney-client
relationship was ever formed and the investigators were not
precluded from questioning the suspect on the unrelated
murder. 1880
In addition, the court rejected defendant's claim that under
People v. Ermo, 18 8 1 his rights were violated by the officer's
questioning. In Ermo, the defendant was interrogated by officers
on charges of two sex offenses. 1882 During the interrogation, the
police officers impermissibly questioned the defendant regarding
an assault charge in order to secure a confession to an unrelated
homicide charge. 1883 The court held that the defendant's
statements with respect to the homicide charges should be
suppressed because the defendant's initial waiver to an attorney
1875. Id. at 324, 420 N.E.2d at 46, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
1876. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d at 169, 397 N.E.2d at 710-11, 422 N.Y.S.2d at

19.
"1877. Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d at 324, 420 N.E.2d at 46, 438 N.Y.S.2d at
248.
1878.
1879.
1880.
1881.
1882.
1883.

Id. at 326, 420 N.E.2d at 48, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
Ruff, 81 N.Y.2d at 334, 615 N.E.2d at 614, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
Id.
47 N.Y.2d 863, 392 N.E.2d 1248, 419 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1979).
Id. at 864, 392 N.E.2d at 1249, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
Id. at 865, 392 N.E.2d at 1249, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
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expired when the officers wrongfully questioned the defendant on
unrelated homicide charges. 1884 The Ruff court rejected
defendant's reliance on Ermo because once again, the case at bar
did not present an interference with attorney-client privilege. 1885
Distinguishing Enno, the court stated that the attorney-client
relationship was interfered with because the police interrogated
the defendant on a pending charge to elicit statements on an
unrelated matter. 1886 Absent actual representation, statements
made on unrelated matters, while being questioned on pending
1887
charges, do not require suppression.
In the case at bar, the court concentrated solely on whether
questioning of the defendant, in the absence of representation on
the pending charges, required suppression of statements made on
an unrelated matter. 1888 The court concluded that defendant's
right to counsel was not violated and therefore suppression was
1889
not required.
The federal constitutional right to counsel also includes more
than the assistance of counsel during trial. As stated by the
Supreme Court in Maine v. Moulton, 1890 "to deprive a person of
counsel during the period prior to trial may be more damaging
189 1
than denial of counsel during the trial itself."
The United States Supreme Court has also stated that to
exclude evidence from pending charges, to which the right to
counsel has not yet attached, would "unnecessarily frustrate the
public's interest in the investigation of criminal activities." 1892
Therefore, the right to question a defendant concerning matters
unrelated to pending charges does not violate the Sixth
Amendment, even if the defendant has counsel appointed for the
pending charges. Should the defendant make a statement about
1884. Id.

1885.
1886.
1887.
1888.
1889.

Ruff, 81 N.Y.2d at 334, 615 N.E.2d at 614, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
Id.
Id. at 335, 615 N.E.2d at 614, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
Id. at 331-32, 615 N.E.2d at 612, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
Id. at 332, 615 N.E.2d at 612, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 222.

1890. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).

1891. Id. at 170.
1892. Id. at 180.
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charges to which his counsel rights have attached, this will
violate the Sixth Amendment and, thus, be inadmissible. In short,
while the federal courts do not distinguish between whether or
not there has been a waiver of counsel for pending charges, the
New York courts draw the distinction as evidenced in the
Kazmarick line of cases.
People v. West 1893
(decided June 8, 1993)
The criminal defendant claimed that his right to counsel under
the State Constitution 894 attached indelibly when counsel entered
his appearance at defendant's lineup and instructed law officials
not to question his client. 1895 In addition, defendant claimed that
his state right to counsel was violated when law officials used an
informant to surreptitiously tape-record incriminating statements
he had made. 1896 In deciding these issues, the court had to
determine the precise meaning of "indelible attachment."
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
appellate division and held that since defendant's right to counsel
had "attached indelibly," the taped statements were taken in
violation of the defendant's right to counsel. 1897 Consequently, a
new trial was ordered. 1898
In this case, the defendant was convicted of murder in the
second degree in the Supreme Court, New York County, and that
conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division, First
Department. 1899 Defendant was part of a three-man drug
operation, based in Manhattan. 1900 On June 15, 1982, there was
a fight in front of the house and Sylvester Coleman was
1893. 81 N.Y.2d 370, 615 N.E.2d 968, 599 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1993).

1894. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section 6 provides in pertinent part: "In any
trial in any case whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and
defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions . . . ." Id.
1895. West, 81 N.Y.2d at 372, 615 N.E.2d at 969, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 485.

1896.
1897.
1898.
1899.
1900.

Id. at 372, 615 N.E.2d at 969-70, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 485-86.
Id. at 373, 615 N.E.2d at 970, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
Id.
People v. West, 183 A.D.2d 419, 583 N.Y.S.2d 396 (lst Dep't 1992).
West, 81 N.Y.2d at 372, 615 N.E.2d at 969, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
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